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The Dynamics of Law and Conventions 
Christian Bessy ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Dynamik von Recht und Konventionen«. In this contribution, an 
endogenous conception of law is defended which can be deployed in regard of 
different scales of time and domains of the law. In this article, the focus is 
mainly on labor law. In the first part, a history of the French employment con-
tract law is presented by proposing a grid of its foundations and evolution 
from the distinction of different principles of justice generating conventions. 
The change of conventions and its impact on law is precisely treated. In a sec-
ond part, the recent evolution of this law will be exposed by showing the key 
role played by legal intermediaries in the contractualization of the working re-
lationship, based on a database of employment contracts. It is shown how law-
yers can generate an increasing strategic use of law, disconnected from territo-
rialized conventions, if they do not play their role of mediator between 
different logics. In the conclusion, the emergence of a transnational law and 
the transformation of the lawyer profession are questioned. 
Keywords: Institutions, law, conventions, intermediaries. 
1.  Introduction 
Economics of convention (EC) has integrated the analysis of legal rules along-
side other approaches which are interested in the way institutions are structur-
ing economic exchanges and which avoid different forms of functionalism – 
thus differing with approaches searching for optimal institutions or for the 
minimization of transaction costs (Salais 1998; Bessy and Favereau 2003). 
From this standpoint, EC has followed the work of the early American institu-
tionalists who were highly influenced by the pragmatist philosophy (Com-
mons 1934). But EC has also been in search for the continuity between eco-
nomics (and sociology) and law because of its interest in operations of 
“qualification” (of entities that make reference to a set of rules). These opera-
tions are present in juridical judgments as well as in legitimate judgments 
(Thévenot 1992, 2012). EC has also been interested in studying the game of 
interpretation of (incomplete) legal rules with reference to conventions and a 
pluralist theory of justice (Ricoeur 1995).  
                                                             
∗  Christian Bessy, IDHES, ENS-Cachan, 61 Avenue du Président Wilson, 94 230 Cachan, France; 
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This integration results initially from EC’s empirical interest for public poli-
cies, especially in the field of employment and from the interest in the ways 
they are evaluated (Salais et al. 1999; Bessy et al. 1995). Therefore, EC has 
developed a whole methodology for the analysis of law, of the genesis of jurid-
ical categories (lawsuits, public debates and forms of knowledge which have 
preceded them),1 and of the usage actors make of law in various situations, 
thereby examining the different juridical doctrines as well as their relations to 
economic arguments. In particular, we pointed out a convergence when eco-
nomic analysis considers authority as an organizing principal (Bessy and Ey-
mard-Duvernay 1995). Without underestimating the incentive strength of law, 
and as a result, accept a minimum of consequentialism (cause-effect relation), 
EC takes into account the way by which the law is built and makes sense, and the 
resources that are mobilized. Instead of considering the legal rule as a mecha-
nism, or reducing it to its enunciation, it is necessary not only to take into account 
the case-law interpretations, but also to study how these interpretations are ad-
justed progressively by the legal professionals according to the specificities of 
productive configurations and the conventions which are at work. 
Thus, this methodology has always contained an historical point of view so 
as to better understand the invention and the stabilization of legal categories.2 
As a result, the institutionalization process – its normative power – does not 
only depend on the political energy or the particular will of a government, nor 
on the promotion of a good balance between different concerns, but also on the 
decentralized search of cooperative solutions, combining cognitive frameworks 
and the political construction of interests. We can therefore consider institu-
tionalization, and in particular the regulative power of law, as an interactive 
process between legal texts and cooperative solutions or conventions elaborat-
ed by actors themselves at the micro level (for their coordination), process in 
which different kinds of “legal intermediaries” play an important role (De 
Munck 2006; Bessy et al. 2011).  
Following this endogenous conception of law, the work of Cottereau (2002) 
on the role played by local jurisdictions (like the French Conseil des 
Prud’hommes) in defining the “bon droit” gives a striking illustration of our 
argument. The author describes the role of the “bon droit” in the normative life 
of occupations in the 19th century, a role difficult to imagine nowadays consid-
ering our current representations of the function of labor law. But this concept 
was common in the 19th century and was opposed to the (formal) law, stretch-
                                                             
1 As we show in Bessy (2012a), these debates lie on the anterior constitution of different 
kinds of associations, collective bodies elaborating critical arguments, political claims, cog-
nitive artefacts such as statistics, categories, and definitions of products or technological 
process.  
2 The “Dictionnaire historique de l’économie-droit” of Alessandro Stanziani (2007) constitutes 
a systematic exploitation of this perspective extended to all the legal categories that have a 
link with economic activities.  
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ing on two poles legitimate legality and textual legality. The invocation of the 
“bon droit” led to a critical requirement of legitimacy on the part of citizens 
questioning the legality on its well-foundedness. 
But outside of these spaces of collective bargaining around work rules, 
based on relations of delegation of employers and employees, we can regard all 
the ‘public spaces’ as being subject to a requirement of justification. In these 
public spaces, contradictorily different ways to evaluate the work and distribute 
roles and rights are discussed and weighed. Among the entities that introduce 
mediations between the principles of justice and ordinary judicial judgments, 
one can also consider today an increasing number of professionals (lawyers, 
arbitrators, mediators, in-house lawyers, professional associations or advocacy 
groups) who develop legal expertise. They occupy a privileged position in the 
articulation of different logics of actions in their everyday practices, and con-
tribute to define what law is, but sometimes they increase its formal character 
by making it a very strategic resource. 
Indeed, these intermediaries provide relevant information upstream and 
downstream of the development of legal provisions or judicial decision. By 
implementing principles of justice in cognitive and practical devices, they 
allow the law to have a certain effectiveness in exercising its regulatory func-
tion instead of relying on the sole will of governments or the intervention of 
judges. This leads to a vision of law limited to “macro” actors and a legal rule 
regarded as a pure incentive scheme binding optimal behaviors and defined by 
experts who would have a perfect understanding of the social world. 
Such an endogenous conception of law can be deployed in regard to differ-
ent scales of time and domains of the law. In this contribution, we will focus 
mainly on labor law. In the first part, we present a history of the French em-
ployment contract law by proposing a grid of its foundations and evolution 
from the distinction of different principles of justice.3 We treat precisely the 
change of conventions and its impact on law. In a second part, we will expose 
the recent evolution of this law by showing the key role played by legal interme-
diaries in the contractualization of the working relationship, based on a database 
of employment contracts. We show how lawyers can generate an increasing 
strategic use of law, disconnected from territorialized conventions, if they do not 
play their role of mediator. In conclusion, we will question the emergence of a 
transnational law and the transformation of the lawyer profession. 
                                                             
3 As we show in Bessy and Favereau (2003), in regards to Ricoeur (1995), this is one of the 
basic functions of the law to decide between different types of rules, prioritize different 
types of social goods at any given time. 
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2.  The Long-Term Dynamic of Conventions and Law 
As a first step, building on the model of the “Economies of worth” (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006),4 we can distinguish different types of conventions, or 
implicit relationship patterns, which founded the French labor law. We propose 
that the rationale and the codification of this law were based on these justified 
conventions that did not evacuate the struggle of interests and the logic of 
balance of powers in their genesis. This enables us to account for the plurality 
of the principles of justification within the French employment contract law. In 
a second sub-section, we will examine the issue of the emergence of new con-
ventions that shape new practices which can be or not consolidated by the law, 
following a dynamic already described by Commons (1934). 
2.1   The Justified Models of French Labor Law 
A good starting point among others (Didry 2012), is the argumentation devel-
oped by Cottereau (2002) in which he examines the transformation of the “la-
bor law” on the occasion of the “railway officers” issue (which gave rise to the 
first law on dismissal in December 27, 1890) and of work accidents (1898 law). 
Among the explanatory elements of this transformation, the author presents the 
invention of the notion of “employment contract” at the turn of 19th and 20th 
century, as a doctrinal claim instituting the relationship of hierarchical subordina-
tion as founding legal category of this concept. It questions one hundred years of 
jurisprudence that sought to correct the social practices likely to reproduce rela-
tions of servitude. Instead of the scheme of equity based on the requirement of 
genuinely reciprocal consents, as in the case of the “job contract” (contrat de 
louage d’ouvrage), the logic of servitude resurfaced and became widespread. 
We can extend the history of labor law proposed by Cottereau by highlight-
ing other principles of justification of the law allowing to get out of the only 
confrontation, typical of the 19th century, between household dependency links 
(domestic order of worth) and market mechanisms for working-class emancipa-
tion (market order of worth).5 Hence, “civic principles” (in the meaning of 
                                                             
4 In their model of justification, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) advance the main idea that 
coordination and evaluation involve “justification”: that is to say what is good and just in a 
certain “world” (“cité” in French). From this perspective, the notion of “convention” refers to 
the definition (shared representation) of the common good, being given a plurality of fair 
principles allowing judging (and ranking) people and things. It leads to consider more ex-
plicitly both the cognitive and deontic (if not political) aspects of conventions, although 
certain conventions have the pure practical aspect of reducing the costs of coordination. 
5  This tension between these two orders of worth has been particularly studied by Cha-
teauraynaud (1991) in his analysis of the institutionalization of the staff regulations (régle-
ment intérieur) at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Following the work of Cottereau 
on Conseil des Prud’hommes, but also the model of Economies of worth of Boltanski and 
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Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) will give justification to collective branch 
agreements based on a new form of solidarity and expression of the collective 
interests of workers (and employers). The reference to an “industrial order” will 
justify the establishment of a set of standards for occupational health and safety at 
work, as well as social insurance based on the concept of “professional risk”, 
“lump sum liability” and associated cognitive devices (accounting, statistics).6  
From a historical perspective, it is a compromise between these two orders 
of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot speak of a “civico-industrial” compromise) 
that can explain the development of labor legislation from the interwar period 
until the 1980s. Labor relations are primarily governed by a collective status 
negotiated and based on employment stability. This worker protection in refer-
ence to collective status (Camerlinck 1958) is a qualification based on the “post 
of work” (poste de travail) it occupies, and is a peculiarity of the French labor 
law relatively to other countries (Marsden 1999). As a consequence, this third 
model puts other equity schemes in the background, but the latter does not disap-
pear completely. The concept of hierarchical subordination is always at the core 
of the jurisprudential definition of the notion of “employment contract.” 
Apart from this longue-durée historical perspective, seeking to highlight a 
dominant pattern of equity retained by labor law, it is important to keep in 
mind the plurality of the legitimate foundations of contemporary labor law and 
its plasticity, which was already present in the Civil Code as early as in the 
19th century (Bessy 1993). It is this plasticity of the law that can meet the 
legitimate claims of actors in the employment relationship and ensure continui-
ty between business rules, professional practices, and positive law. This leads 
to consider the “enterprise link” (Lien d’entreprise), besides the contractual 
relationship between the employer and the employee, as embedded in a broader 
social link, and to give a horizon of justice and political commitments made by 
all members of the company. This “political economy of the firm” (Eymard-
Duvernay 2004) contrasts with the neo-institutional approach that views the 
firm as a “nexus of contracts” (Williamson 1985).7  
                                                                                                                                
Thévenot (2006), the author shows how the legal controversies concerning the issue of re-
sponsibility (at the occasion of lawsuits) are crucial moments in which conventions become 
more explicit and several horizons of meaning are confronted. 
6  Concerning the plurality of “labour conventions” during the French interwar period, see the 
work of Didry (2002) on the genesis of collective agreements of the Popular Front. 
7  However, from a theoretical perspective, it is important to take into consideration the 
critique Williamson addresses to the “legal centralism.” Its too formal character inhibits an 
adequate regulation of labour relations which are characterized by uncertainty and which 
are an engagement in idiosyncratic links. He tries to demonstrate the superiority of a legal 
model fundamentally based on the private ordering and therefore on a form of self-
regulation based on collective bargaining or more informal rules in enterprises. He defends 
a kind of “legal pluralism” in which lawsuits constitute an institutionalized way of disputes 
resolution, at once the informal rules or conventions at work are breached. In this aspect 
Williamson’s approach converges with EC. 
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A similar analysis can be used in the study of “The invention of unemploy-
ment” following the one conducted by Salais et al. (1999). Along this vein, the 
historical study of the categorization of unemployment in Germany proposed 
by Zimmermann (2001) is particularly interesting, as it manages to articulate 
long-term (longue durée) and short-term variations. Over the long period (from 
the end of the 19th century until the Second World War), she describes the 
gradual emergence of the institution of unemployment and its stabilization by 
virtue of the creation of a new form of State, a new civic link, conferring rights 
of compensation to all unemployed people (including manual workers). The 
variation of criteria of definition and compensation of the unemployed during 
this period ultimately obeys different conventions depending on the nature of 
the “common good” on which they are based.  
Following this perspective, the convention concept referring to a principle of 
justice would have a more situated feature in the sense that it would base the 
agreement on the definition of the qualifications of the unemployed, in particular 
spatio-temporal space. The agreement on the principle of compensation for in-
voluntary unemployment is not actually changed and constitutes the heart of the 
institution. This kind of historical analysis accounts for the plastic nature of la-
bour law following the conventions at stake in different contexts, and in particu-
lar the degree of industrialization in different regions (Salais et al. 1999). 
2.2  The Emergence of New Conventions and their Impact on Law 
From an analytical point of view, the emergence of new conventions which can 
gradually modify the interpretation of current law or create new legal rules still 
has to be understood. Indeed, some historians have raised criticisms over the 
lack of historical construction of the “orders of worth.”  
We can thus understand how the historical analysis conducted by Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2007) led them to focus on the institutionalization of the tests of 
justice (épreuves de justice), “collective” and cognitive devices associated with 
the establishment of a new “connectionist” order of worth.8  
The movement described is, during the contemporary period, the question of 
categorizations imposed during the previous phase of capitalism based on in-
tense collective bargaining at different levels. This social movement is largely 
driven by the State and allows the organization of long careers and the regula-
tion of income distribution. This challenge that the authors refer to as a “civico-
industrial compromise,” is explained by the individualization of the employ-
ment relationship. This individualization finds its roots in the criticism of the 
1970s based on the rhetoric of independence and responsibility at work, and the 
rigidity of rules and the bureaucratic shackles of large organizations and ad-
                                                             
8 On this issue see also the work of Lafaye et al. (2011) on the genesis of a possible “green 
worth.” 
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ministration. These social (and artist) criticisms against the hierarchical situa-
tion are going to impulse the premises of the development of the “city by pro-
jects” in which justified action is based on the permanent redeployment of 
resources and the transferability of skills. This management reform relies on 
the developing techniques of information and communication and the emer-
gence of a new convention of equivalence in terms of information. 
However, Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) stress that the requests for flexi-
bility weaken the foundation of a true city because of the difficulty to imple-
ment institutionalized tests (épreuves instituées) that build on categorizations 
prior to conventional codifications of the social world. They are thus lead to the 
observation of a certain institutional deficit following the withdrawal of the 
intervention of the State. As Diaz-Bone (2012) shows in his analysis of the co-
evolution of conventions and institutions, this situation of incoherence is in 
principle transitory. This transition contributes to the growth of inequalities 
partially provoked by strategic uses of current law, in particular from the part 
of employers that have a strong bargaining power on the labor market. In this 
sense, Boltanski and Chiapello advance that (justified) “criticism” is not the 
only engine of the evolution of institutions and that we must take into account 
diffuse relations of power or domination.  
But we can also acknowledge that this new connectionist convention has 
widely inspired the development of individual rights. Following this perspec-
tive, our work on hiring practices shows how the convention of individualiza-
tion (proper to a connectionist order) tends to de-contextualize the evaluation 
of competencies, which are detached from a precise occupational context, and 
to valorize the most general capabilities so that competencies are seen as be-
longing to isolated individuals (Bessy et al. 2001). This logic of individualiza-
tion of competency is reinforced by public policies that consider young people 
and the unemployed as individual subjects who enter into contracts with “pro-
ducers” of training to improve their “human capital.” Evaluation and occupa-
tional guidance tools, including the nomenclature of occupations and profes-
sional qualifications, attest to a conception of competencies defined outside of 
any professional context, thus favoring a purely functional approach to work, 
training and recruitment. Individual subjects become more and more responsi-
ble for their training9 and their performance.10  
We are now going to present a second illustration of this dynamic between 
conventions and law with the example of the contractualization of employment 
relationship. 
                                                             
9  Such a process of individualization is also activated by the development of “individual 
training rights” and the implementation of different credit saving formula. 
10  On this issue, see the work of Lejeune (2013) showing the diffusion of this convention in 
banking industry with the development of individual pay schemes. 
HSR 40 (2015) 1  │  69 
3.  The Contractualization of the Employment Relationship: 
Advances and Limits 
Many studies have shown the diversity of the employment relationship in rela-
tion to a wide range of formal and informal institutions (Petit 2003). On our 
side, we have revealed the plurality of conventions and uses of law since a 
statistical study on the clauses of the contracts of employment (Bessy 2007).11 
Our typology underlines the plasticity of French labor law and the different 
principles of justice which ground it. These principles are mobilized by the 
actors, concretized by legal devices, like the written contract, in order to make 
the law effective, in particular protecting employees while insuring efficiency 
to firms’ productive activity. 
Beyond the diversity of the employment relationship, our data set of employ-
ment contracts shows diachronically the extent to which the ‘revival of the con-
tract’ during the turn of the 1980s and 1990s was both the product and the factor 
of the employment relationships evolution. These relationships are more and 
more marked, although to different degrees, by a legalization process which relies 
on the development of the contract considered both as a ‘human resources man-
agement’ device and a legal category serving to interpret and solve conflicts at 
work. It is what we call “contractualization” (Lyon Caen 1988; Jeammaud 1989). 
This evolution can be considered as social progress. Moreover, it is in line 
with the European employment policy objectives concerning the information 
and the consultation of employee at individual level (1991 Directive). The 
notion of “contractualization” is perhaps too strong for expressing an increas-
ing formalism responding to the employers’ obligation to provide employees 
with a written statement of their main conditions of employment, or a proce-
dural individualization in the sense that collective agreements are no longer the 
main source for the definition of employments conditions. In doing so, we take 
on the risk of forgetting the proper commitment of the parties concerning spe-
cific provisions such as the trial period or the covenant non-to-compete. In this 
way, the contractual terms are independent of any change brought by collective 
agreements. Besides, it may seem curious to use the term “contractualization” 
                                                             
11  The database consists of a total of 403 contracts, 86% of them signed between 1993 and 
2004, which come from over 300 firms in various sectors. The data on the characteristics of 
the firm and the job are also available. The content of the text of the contract, that to vary-
ing degrees crystallizes a learning process related to prior disputes, can then be considered 
as a source of information on the rules framing the employment relationship or, at least, 
the rules in relation to which the parties seek guarantees of one kind or another. As a result, 
the part of what parties can bargain, the weight of the different formal and informal obli-
gations can be variable according to the conceptions of employment relationships, the col-
lective references which support the cooperation between the actors when they are not en-
gaged in a pure relation of power. 
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for provisions through which the employer increases his power of decision-
making and for which the employee does not have any other opportunity than 
to accept the terms because of his weak position. It would be better to speak, on 
the contrary, of “decontractualization.” We are here faced with all the ambigui-
ty inherent in the notion of “contract.” 
Even if this contractualization process is limited to certain configurations, it 
would be as so much social progress as it does not increase litigation. Indeed, 
since the beginning of the 1990s, the statistics about the disputes settled 
through employment tribunals (Conseil des prudh’ommes) show certain regu-
larity and even a slight decrease: from 224,158 demands in 1993 to 207,770 in 
2004. Around 95% of the settlements concern dismissals.  
On the contrary, the appeals (appels) on employment tribunals decisions 
have slightly increased (from 13.9% to 18.8% during the same period); idem in 
the case of the labor division of the high court (Pourvois en Cassation) (Munoz 
Perez and Serverin 2005). These evolutions highlight a more intense recourse 
to formal law, and more costly disputes resolution mechanisms, which may 
lead to a strategic use of law. In adopting such an approach, legal professionals 
no longer play a mediation role but risk reinforcing the gap between formal law 
and bon droit (Cottereau 2002). 
3.1  The Mediation of Lawyers 
This leads us to reflect upon labor law reforms by considering professional 
constraints on “intermediaries of law” and the legal services market in which 
they operate (Bessy 2012b). Following Edelman (2003),12 lawyers make 
changes in the law and the new risks run by organizations because of patterns 
of litigation known. They write on websites or in professional newspapers and 
give training courses to other lawyers and managers, which are so many means 
to increase the reputation of lawyers. They may also work as consultants for 
non-specialized lawyers, especially for in-house legal counsel within organiza-
tions. In doing so, they maintain very close links with both corporate manage-
ment and other management consulting firms.  
This activity makes it possible to single out “models” of compliance with 
the law and to better assess the possibilities of a lawsuit and the responsibility 
of companies. In this respect, they can exaggerate the threats (sources of legal 
                                                             
12  One refers here to the approach of this American sociologist of law who defends an endog-
enous notion of law. She shows how the practice of law professionals, concerning civil 
rights as regards employment in the United States, fits in with a double process of “mana-
gerialization” of the law and “legalization” of organizations at the crossroads between the 
legal and organizational fields. Because of the abstract and ambiguous character of these 
civil rights, lawyers in particular, by means of their consulting activity, collectively build 
models of compliance with the law that integrate organizations’ objectives of efficiency and 
profitability. 
HSR 40 (2015) 1  │  71 
insecurity) represented by the law, in order to enhance their power and their 
status within the companies, in particular in matter of dismissals. 
Our proper work shows that the strategic use of law can also be active at the 
moment of drafting the employment contract by legal professionals (Bessy 2007). 
The diachronic treatment of our data sets of employment contracts illustrates a 
dynamical interaction between contractual practices and the jurisprudence.  
3.2  Instrumentalization of Law and Relations of Power 
During the 1990s, the increasing implementation of ‘flexibility clauses’ that 
respond to the jurisprudential transformation concerning the amendment of the 
contract gives us a good illustration.13 This growth is not only due to the collec-
tive bargaining concerning work flexibility (hours, job contents, and workplace) 
but also the fact that employers want to reinforce their management power so as 
to expand, in particular, geographic and professional mobility. 
The litigations caused by these clauses have then led the jurisprudence to 
limit them by opposing the principle of respect for individual liberties. In turn, 
this limitation has made jurisprudential criteria less strict on this matter and has 
given more interpretation power to judges. This evolution makes their deci-
sions more difficult to predict and hence reduces legal certainty. Such a dynam-
ic shows that the complexity of law largely criticized in France by the de Vir-
ville Report (2004), can be the result of its strategic use and lead to the loss of 
its regulatory power. 
This use of flexibility clauses in the drafting of contracts, or any clause fa-
voring the dismissal of the employee is all the more current, as the employee 
has less individual and collective bargaining power in the labor market (Bessy 
and Szpiro 2011). With this strategic use of law, the employment relationship is 
largely marked by relations of power. Furthermore, this weak position can, in 
turn, explain the fact that the opportunities for individual enforcement of con-
tractual rights have been far and few between, particularly when the employee 
does not have the support of trade unions.  
                                                             
13  Indeed, there was a change in judicial precedents in the late eighties and early nineties 
concerning amendments to the employment contract. The employer's power is now limited 
insofar as any amendment to an essential element in the employment contract has to be 
explicitly approved by the employee (Waquet 1999). Aiming to protect employees, legal 
precedents reaffirm the contract mechanism and the value of initial commitments in an 
economic configuration nonetheless marked by a strong demand for flexibility in the em-
ployment relationship. So this new rationale leads to a contract with renegotiation until 
either there is a mutual agreement to modify terms or the contract is properly terminated. 
There is a major difference with the US regime of employment at will, which does not re-
quire any renegotiation. In order to acquire some freedom of action, the French employers 
have sought to introduce explicit clauses of flexibility, thus making individual dismissal eas-
ier if the employee refuses their application. 
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This evolution of contractual practices which favor the individual dismissal 
of employees offers a less optimistic view of the role played by individual 
agreement, as this legalization processes risks profiting uniquely the employers 
by reinforcing their legal security.14 In the absence of individual or collective 
bargaining power, the employees must accept very flexible employment condi-
tions without any actual counterparts.  
This degradation of employment conditions can also affect more skilled-
employees that work in innovative companies (like start-ups in NTIC industry) 
and condemn them permanently to success by always reaching more ambitious 
objectives. Moreover, these employees can lose their freedom of work when 
the employers systematically multiply contractual guarantees that are designed 
to protect the firm’s immaterial assets, often connected within pools of assets 
inaccessible to employees. Although these clauses have a large formal aspect and 
are scarcely mobilized (Bessy 2007), there is a strong asymmetry between the 
employer’s freedom to undertake and the employees’ freedom to work. This 
productive configuration, marked by the contractualization of the employment 
relationship, would bear witness to the loss of collective supports within the firms 
and more widely within the industry or the profession. The flexibility and reactiv-
ity constraints, proper to the functioning of ‘firms networks’ and a mode of or-
ganization by project (connectionist order of worth), hinder the grounding of new 
institutions supported by operations of social facts categorization (Boltanski 
and Chiapello 2007). This institutional deficit can increase the inequalities 
which are not compensated by the increase of social individual rights. 
3.3  A New Political Regime 
This contractualization process must be situated within a more political trans-
formation and a new form of state intervention. Indeed, the EC’s agenda as a 
socio-economic analysis of law takes into account the political and legal phi-
losophy so as to examine the ideological questions and the emergence of the 
European law at the macro level. 
Within this perspective, the ‘revival of contract’ goes into the whole society 
and constitutes more horizontal social links. We can sketch here at least two 
interpretations in order to characterize the emergence of a new political regime. 
The first interpretation is that labor law would be no more a governance device, 
and would become more and more procedural. A new political regime would 
emerge by relying on the procedure according to which decisions are taken and 
not on their substantial content, which would be the product of the actors’ 
deliberative activity. Following the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1995), 
                                                             
14  This process may constitute an explaining factor of the increasing in dismissals for individu-
al reasons relatively to dismissals for economic reasons, in France from 1992, see Pignoni 
and Zouary (2003). 
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one can wonder if this evolution of labor law would correspond to a new politi-
cal regime in which sovereignty would no longer constitute the main political 
issue. The states (nations) would be overtaken by the reinforcement of regional 
identities and the development of supranational instances, in particular the 
European institutions which are in debate today.  
The increasingly decentralized character of the new forms of collective bar-
gaining illustrates well this view (Jobert 2007). We can quote the increase in 
company agreements concerning work time reduction, training, and definition 
and assessment of competencies. Furthermore, territorial entities are more and 
more considered as new spaces of consultation and negotiation between the 
stakeholders of the firms. This promotion of ‘social dialogue’ and of information 
and consultation arrangements with a procedural orientation is widely ensured by 
European Union law (2002 Directive concerning information and consultation at 
the collective level). To maintain a “pluralist space,” the consultation is extended 
to new actors, new stake-holders, and minority groups which claim the recogni-
tion of their identity, with the risk of missing the actual interests at stake. 
However, the contractualization of individual and collective employment re-
lations can be interpreted by another political philosophy which grounded the 
fiction of contract used by the economists. The latter consider a contract be-
tween equal parties as a set of incentive rules which acquire authority because 
they are the product of pure rational beings limiting their liberty while preserv-
ing their interests. Following this perspective, the more the individual agree-
ments correspond to a balance between divergent interests, the more they will 
be self-enforcing.15 This contractual approach of law relies on the predomi-
nance of “subjective rights” guaranteeing liberties and interests of individuals. 
In this approach, all legislative intervention is questioned because it risks dis-
turbing the consensus between the individuals.16  
One moves closer to the British political regime, which establishes a distinc-
tion between the spontaneous activities of the civil society and the limited 
responsibilities of the state.17 The negotiation based on well-understood inter-
ests of each other constitutes a self-regulation answering the freely consented 
necessity to live in society. The negotiation process cannot be imposed by the 
government contrary to the precedent political regime which, failing to struggle 
                                                             
15  The recourse to ‘transaction’ as a contractual device of the employment contract breach 
gives a good illustration. On this issue, see the PhD work of Melot (2003). In particular, the 
author shows that transactions have increased since 1996 in France. Moreover, this kind of 
contractual breach spreads to all the employees and constitutes a substitute to collective 
dismissals in the frame of firms’ restructurings. 
16  On this issue see the analysis of de Descombes (2004) dedicated to the criticism of individu-
alist philosophy. 
17  Notice that the rise of deregulatory policies in the 1980s and early 1990s, undermining 
collective bargaining, has nonetheless sought to strengthen competition and the use of 
contractual devices into different industries and labour markets, including public sector. 
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against inequalities via substantial social measures, stipulates obligations to 
negotiate, to inform and to consult for the different stakeholders of the firms. 
The analysis of these political regimes must go further and associate the dif-
ferent conceptions of the “legislation” and the “contract” (Supiot 2003).18 They 
both ground the construction of European institutions by reducing the tradition-
al prerogatives of the state-nation, in particular its social justice policy, and by 
defining “fundamental social rights” whose information and consultation rights 
make part. The decline of the notion of “employment status,” defined collec-
tively and recognizing the hierarchical relationship between the employer and 
the employee, is risky when the latter has few bargaining power into the labor 
market. The protections supplied by the defense of individual liberties play a 
limited role and do not counterbalance the absence of pre-defined collective 
guarantees. By mobilizing the spirit of “contractual solidarism,” an author like 
Jamin (2001) thinks that it is dangerous to confuse the “contract” with the 
contractualist philosophy when the parties have unequal powers. The funda-
mental social principles are not sufficient to fully protect the workers. They 
only constitute a minimalist protection inspired by the “liberal discourse and its 
humanitarian backfires” (Jamin 2001, 470). 
4.  Conclusion 
EC defends an endogenous conception of law which can be deployed in regard of 
different scales of time so as to apprehend the pragmatic-historical nexus of law 
and conventions. We have presented different dynamics between both without 
the drawing of causal relations because of the plurality of conventions. These 
dynamics give place to the activities of “intermediaries of law” (in particular 
lawyers) which define models of compliance with legal rules and which connect 
different kind of norms, without avoiding the risk of falling into formalism and 
strategic use of law, which are source of unfairness and economic inefficiency. 
The same kind of analysis has also been developed concerning the matter of 
intellectual property rights, a domain in which the strategic uses of law are as 
important as the huge monetary sums that are at stake (Bessy 2006). The in-
creasing stakes relative to intellectual property rights litigation reflect overin-
vestment in legal resources and their instrumentalization, with the result that 
                                                             
18  The reflection followed by Supiot in this paper overtakes the distinction between ‘legisla-
tion’ and ‘contract’ in order to take into account the emergence of new conceptions both of 
the law (legislative power whose one part is transferred to the social partners) and of the 
contract which, in the absence of contractual liberty, becomes an enslavement device. The 
author underlines that this enslavement is likely to concern, not only, the employees, but all 
the actors, including public administration, via a set of norms and indicators who condition 
their behavior. 
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instead of being a source of security, the law in this area has become a force for 
uncertainty, criticized for its social and economic inefficiency. This uncertainty 
is reinforced by the multiplicity and complexity of regulations (international 
treaties and directives, national laws, and private standards of regulation) as it 
is also appearing in labor law.  
The topic of intermediaries of law needs to be grounded because their activi-
ties have shown important evolutionary changes. Indeed, the construction of 
the European internal market endangers the “quality” of the performances of 
legal service, maybe the quality of law if the ongoing process of liberalization 
is driven to its extreme (Bessy 2012b). 
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